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A COMMENTARY ON INGRID WUERTH’S THE 
DUE PROCESS AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS OF FOREIGN NATIONS 
David P. Stewart* 
 
Are foreign States and governments (and their state-owned enterprises) 
“persons” for constitutional purposes?  Do they—should they—have “due 
process” rights under the U.S. Constitution?  Ingrid Wuerth’s thoughtful and 
thoroughly researched article addresses those important questions from both 
the historical and doctrinal perspectives and proposes an innovative 
approach to resolving the issues. 
The following commentary provides additional background and context, 
briefly tracing the origins and history of relevant U.S. case law and noting 
some of the practical implications of answering the questions affirmatively 
or negatively, particularly in light of the various exceptions to U.S. 
jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.  It provides an 
assessment of Wuerth’s analysis and offers some comments on the possible 
implications of her approach. 
INTRODUCTION 
Are foreign states and governments entitled to due process in U.S. courts?  
What about their state-owned enterprises (SOEs)? 
It might seem that the answer should be straightforward:  since “due 
process” is constitutionally mandated, are not all parties to a suit—all 
litigants regardless of their status—entitled to fair and equal treatment?  It 
turns out that the answer is neither as simple nor obvious as one might think, 
and indeed the question has recently become the subject of sharp 
disagreement and contentious litigation.  It raises difficult issues of 
constitutional law, with significant implications not only for litigants and 
their lawyers, but also for the management of U.S. foreign policy. 
That debate forms the backdrop for Professor Wuerth’s carefully 
researched and closely argued analysis in The Due Process and Other 
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the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State.  He is former President of the American 
Branch of the International Law Association and, with Professor Wuerth, was a Co-Reporter 
for the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 
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Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations,1 about which I offer some 
comments below.  But first, to put things in context for those who may not 
be familiar with the issues, it may be useful to sketch briefly the origins and 
contours of the question. 
I.  THE KATZENBACH AND WELTOVER DECISIONS 
The tale begins (for our purposes) at an unlikely time and in an unexpected 
context—the domestic civil rights movement of the 1960s. 
At the height of that movement, South Carolina challenged the 
constitutionality of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, inter alia on the ground that 
its provisions exceeded the powers of Congress and encroached on an area 
reserved to the States by the U.S. Constitution.  In South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach,2 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected that challenge, in particular 
the State’s contention that portions of the Act—as applied to it—violated its 
constitutional rights to due process.  Among other things, the Supreme Court 
said that “[t]he word ‘person’ in the context of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment cannot, by any reasonable mode of interpretation, be 
expanded to encompass the States of the Union, and to our knowledge this 
has never been done by any court.”3 
In making that statement, the Court was of course addressing the issue in 
a domestic context involving the balance of authority between the federal 
government and the constituent States of the Union, and more particularly 
the rights of a State with respect to the constitutional authority of Congress 
(thus implicating the separation of powers doctrine). 
Twenty-six years later, the Court had occasion to refer to its statement in 
Katzenbach in a very different context—this time involving the rights of a 
foreign state embroiled in litigation in federal court brought by the United 
States and foreign parties under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976 (FSIA).4  In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,5 various holders 
of bonds issued by the Republic of Argentina and its central bank as part of 
a currency stabilization plan brought a breach of contract action against that 
 
 1. Ingrid Wuerth, The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations, 
88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2019). 
 2. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).  The Court upheld provisions of the federal Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 (pertaining to suspension of eligibility tests or devices, review of proposed alteration 
of voting qualifications and procedures, appointment of federal voting examiners, examination 
of applicants for registration, challenges to eligibility listings, termination of listing 
procedures, and enforcement proceedings in criminal contempt cases) as appropriate means 
for carrying out Congress’ constitutional responsibilities under the Fifteenth Amendment and 
consonant with all other provisions of the Constitution. See id. at 308. 
 3. Id. at 323–24 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 164 So. 2d 314, 322 n.5 
(La. 1964); cf. United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 8 (5th Cir. 1963)).  In consequence, 
the Court narrowed its consideration to the question whether, in enacting and applying the 
statute, Congress had exercised its “powers under the Fifteenth Amendment in an appropriate 
manner with relation to the States.” Id. at 324. 
 4. Pub. L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330 and 1605 et seq.). 
 5. 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
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government as a result of its unilateral extension of the time for payment on 
the bonds. 
The case was brought under the FSIA’s “commercial activities” exception 
to foreign sovereign immunity, which specifies that in order for the court to 
have jurisdiction, the acts in question must have had a “direct effect” in the 
United States.6  The Argentine government and its central bank sought 
dismissal of the action on the ground that the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over them violated due process.  More specifically, they argued that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment required the court to construe that 
provision as embodying the “minimum contacts” test of International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington.7 
The Court disagreed.  As a general matter, it noted, the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction is consistent with due process in any case where a defendant has 
sufficient contacts with the United States to satisfy the criteria set forth in 
International Shoe Co.8  In affirming the lower courts’ rejection of 
Argentina’s argument, the Court said: 
Assuming, without deciding, that a foreign state is a “person” for purposes 
of the Due Process Clause, cf. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 
323–324, 86 S. Ct. 803, 815–816, 15 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1966) (States of the 
Union are not ‘persons’ for purposes of the Due Process Clause), we find 
that Argentina possessed ‘minimum contacts’ that would satisfy the 
constitutional test.9 
Even though the Court did in fact make a “minimum contacts” assessment, 
the introductory clause of this statement and its reference to Katzenbach have 
been taken to indicate that—at least for due process jurisdictional purposes—
foreign states can and should be analogized to States of the Union and treated 
similarly.  As Wuerth notes, “[b]ased on this dicta from Weltover, lower 
courts have since uniformly held that foreign states are not ‘persons’ 
protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”10 
II.  WHY IS THE QUESTION IMPORTANT? 
Leaving aside the dubious nature of the equivalence underlying the Court’s 
assumption (foreign states and governments are obviously not “like” States 
of the Union), why does this statement matter?  What difference does it make 
in practice?  Surely, Katzenbach and Weltover cannot mean that foreign 
states, governments, and their SOEs get no “due process” when they sue or 
are sued? 
Of course not, but here is where the issue gets a bit technical, because a 
more precise answer (how much due process, judged by which standards?) 
 
 6. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
 7. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 8. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 647 (citing Corporacíon Mexicana de Mantenimiento 
Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración y Producción, 832 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 
2016)). 
2019] A COMMENTARY ON WUERTH'S DUE PROCESS 105 
depends on where the case is brought and the particular jurisdictional basis 
for the suit in question.  State courts are of course open to suits by and against 
foreign states, SOEs, and individuals on the basis of state law, which (in 
respect of jurisdiction as well as substance) varies to some degree from state 
to state.  The protections of the Fourteenth Amendment will necessarily 
apply, and as developed by the federal courts over the years, the standards 
for assessing the constitutional validity of State court authority depend on the 
extent of the defendant’s connections with the jurisdiction in the given case.11 
In practice, however, most suits involving foreign states and SOEs are 
brought in federal courts.  Those courts exercise two types of jurisdiction:  
so-called “diversity jurisdiction,” in which the case rests for most purposes 
on State law, and “federal question” jurisdiction, in which the case rests on 
federal law.  In both situations, the sufficiency of the jurisdictional nexus is 
judged by Fifth Amendment standards.12 
That raises yet another difficult question:  is there any difference between 
the “due process” standards of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?  As 
relevant to present purposes, the two are textually virtually identical.  The 
Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law,” while the Fourteenth 
Amendment directs that no State of the Union may “deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”13 
Yet some argue that there is a significant difference in the extent of due 
process that each provides.  The contention is that the constraints of the 
Fourteenth Amendment are necessarily stricter than those of the Fifth 
Amendment, at least in the jurisdictional sense.  The reasoning is that the 
former was grounded in concepts of federalism and intended to avoid 
conflicts between the States, a concern not relevant to the Fifth Amendment, 
 
 11. In Weltover, the Court applied the then applicable “minimum contacts” test for the 
exercise of what is known as “specific” (or conduct-based) jurisdiction, which rests on the 
territorial connection of the relevant activity of the defendant and requires that the dispute(s) 
in question must arise out of or be related to the defendant’s particular contacts with the forum. 
504 U.S. 607 at 619.  In such cases, the Supreme Court stated in Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 
277, 284 (2014), “[f]or a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the 
defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State.”  
By distinction, a foreign defendant may be subject to “general” (or “all-purpose”) jurisdiction 
when its connections with the forum are sufficiently extensive (“so continuous and 
systematic”) that it can be considered “at home” in that jurisdiction, and it can therefore be 
subject to suit on essentially any claim. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014); 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).  Foreign states, 
governments and SOEs are highly unlikely to be “at home” in a U.S. jurisdiction, so that most 
cases against them must necessarily rely on “specific jurisdiction.”  See, for example, the 
discussion in Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016), 
cert. denied sub nom. Sokolow v Palestine Liberation Organization, 138 S.Ct. 1438 (2018). 
 12. While it may seem obvious that the Fifth Amendment should govern in “federal 
question” cases, it is an oddity of constitutional jurisprudence that it also applies in “diversity” 
cases, where the territorial reach of the district court’s in personam jurisdiction rests not on 
federal law but on the relevant State “long arm” statute by virtue of the Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(k).  For a proposal to change that arrangement, see Benjamin Spencer, The 
Territorial Reach of Federal Courts, 71 FLA. L. REV. 979 (2019). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
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which in its origin was more concerned with the relationship between the 
federal government and foreign nations respectively.14  If that is true, then 
the federal government, subject only to the narrower constraints of the Fifth 
Amendment, is constitutionally able to exercise significantly broader 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign states, governments, and their SOEs 
than the States could under the Fourteenth Amendment.15 
And indeed, that is the problem.  If foreign states and governments, and by 
extension their SOEs, are not entitled to constitutional “due process” 
protections—at least not in the personal jurisdictional “minimum contacts” 
sense—then they are potentially vulnerable to suit in U.S. courts in 
circumstances where other “persons,” such as non-state entities, are not.  Put 
differently, the prospect is that the U.S. Congress might have the authority to 
extend the jurisdictional reach of U.S. law to foreign states, governments, 
and SOEs far beyond the limits that otherwise apply in suits against foreign 
individuals and entities, such as corporations.16 
III.  WHAT ABOUT JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY? 
Just a moment, you might say.  Are foreign states and governments not 
generally immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts (federal and state) 
under the FSIA?17  If so, why does it matter if they are not protected 
(jurisdictionally) by a “minimum contacts” rule to the extent required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment? 
Yes, they are entitled to jurisdictional immunity under the FSIA, subject 
to a number of exceptions.  The statute itself contains no explicit minimum 
contacts rule; uniquely, it combines subject matter jurisdiction and personal 
jurisdiction by providing that service of process and a cause of action covered 
by one of the exceptions to immunity specified in the statute establishes both.  
Even though Congress took care, in enacting the statute, to acknowledge (and 
 
 14. Cf. Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 835 F.3d 317, 329–30 (2d Cir. 
2016), cert. denied sub nom. Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Organization, 138 S. Ct. 1438 
(2018). 
 15. Another line of argument contends that non-resident aliens lacking property in or 
connections with the United States are covered by neither Amendment, and in effect have no 
constitutional rights, enabling the U.S. Government to assert even broader jurisdictional 
authority. See GSS Group Ltd v. National Port Authority, 680 F.3d 805, 815–17 (D.C. Cir. 
2012); Austin Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process:  Personal Jurisdiction Over 
Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 33 (2006) (“the Fourteenth and 
Fifth Amendments do not protect foreign defendants from jurisdictional assertions”); cf. Mark 
Christopher, Note, Holding Supporters of Terrorism Accountable:  The Exercise of General 
Jurisdiction over the PA and PLO in a Post-Daimler Framework, 45 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
99 (2016); Austen Parrish, Personal Jurisdiction: The Transnational Difference, 59 VA J. 
INT’L L. 97 (2019). 
 16. Whether, and to what extent, congressional authority to do so might be restricted by 
international law is another debated topic, beyond the scope of the present discussion. Cf. 
Aaron Simowitz, Legislating Transnational Jurisdiction, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 325 (2018). 
 17. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330 and 1605 et seq.) 
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conform to) the then prevailing notions of jurisdictional due process,18 over 
time the list of exceptions has grown in numbers, substance, and (most 
relevantly) extraterritorial reach.  Today it covers a number of circumstances 
in which suits can be brought against foreign states and governments in U.S. 
courts that (depending on the specific circumstances) arguably could not be 
brought if judged by “normal” (or contemporary) Fourteenth Amendment 
due process standards.19 
So long as foreign states, governments, and their SOEs are not “persons” 
entitled to constitutional due process, the more relaxed jurisdictional 
standards applicable to suits under the statute are not subject to constitutional 
challenge. 
For example, under one prong of the “commercial activities” exception, 
U.S. courts have jurisdiction over suits against foreign states, governments, 
and SOEs that arises from acts occurring outside United States territory in 
connection with their commercial activities outside the United States.  
However, the act in question must cause “a direct effect in the United 
States”20—without regard to whether the defendant has a sufficient presence 
in or connection to the United States that “normal” due process principles 
would otherwise require.21   
The so-called “expropriation exception” permits suits based on the 
“takings” by a foreign government of rights in property in its own country 
when the taken property (or any property exchanged for such property) is 
“present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried 
on in the United States by the foreign state.”22  That exception has, for 
example, recently been interpreted to cover “genocidal takings” committed 
 
 18. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 
6606 (“A principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity 
from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy 
implications of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that these often crucial 
decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that 
insure due process.”). See also Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States:  
Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. On Administrative Law and Governmental 
Relations of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 31 (1976) (statement of Bruno 
A. Ristau) (“[T]he long-arm feature of the bill will insure that only those disputes which have 
a relation to the United States are litigated in the courts of the United States, and that our courts 
are not turned into small ‘international courts of claims.’  The bill is not designed to open up 
our courts to all comers to litigate any dispute which any private party may have with a foreign 
state anywhere in the world.”). 
 19. For example, under the “expropriation, arbitration or expropriation exceptions” as 
discussed below. 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
 21. See, e.g., Rote v. Zel Custom Manufacturing LLC, 816 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied sub nom. Direccion Gen. de Fabricaciones Militares v. Rote, 137 S. Ct. 199 (2016). 
See also Jacqueline M. Fitch, If the Shoe Fits:  Rethinking Minimum Contacts and the FSIA 
Commercial Activity Exception, Note, 75 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. ONLINE 123 (May 9, 2019) 
(endorsing the Sixth Circuit’s denial of due process under the FSIA’s “direct effect” clause 
and arguing against a “minimum contacts” requirement for commercial activities suits against 
foreign states).  For a contrary view, see Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a “Person”?  
Does It Matter?:  Personal Jurisdiction, Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 115 (2001). 
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). 
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abroad by foreign governments against their own citizens as well as third-
country nationals.23 
The statute’s “arbitration exception”24 can be read to allow suits in U.S. 
courts to enforce arbitral agreements between foreign sovereign parties 
concerning commercial activities having no connections to the United States, 
and arbitration awards rendered pursuant to such agreements, so long as the 
agreement or award is covered by a relevant multilateral treaty to which the 
United States is a party.25 
Even the most territorially focused of all the FSIA exceptions—the “non-
commercial tort exception,”26 which has been consistently interpreted by 
U.S. courts to require the “entire tort” to have occurred within the United 
States—has been under pressure from plaintiffs seeking to apply it to torts 
resulting from actions of foreign states, governments, and SOEs occurring at 
least in part—if not entirely—in other countries.27 
IV.  THE STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM EXCEPTION 
Perhaps most importantly, the “state-sponsored terrorism” exception28 
removes the immunity of foreign states that have been designated as “state 
sponsors” in cases seeking damages for personal injury or death caused by 
certain specified acts of terrorism committed outside the United States if the 
claimant is a U.S. national, a member of the U.S. armed forces, or a U.S. 
government employee or contractor (or “the legal representative” of such 
persons, without regard to their nationality).29  In such cases, the 
jurisdictional nexus is supplied not by any territorial connection between the 
United States and the specific acts in question but solely by the nationality of 
the victims. 
 
 23. Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Philipp v. Fed. 
Rep. Germany, 925 F.3d 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Katsas, J., dissenting). 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6). 
 25. See, e.g., TMR Energy Limited v. State Property Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005) (enforcing Swedish arbitral award in favor of Cypriot company against Ukraine 
SOE involving contract with no U.S. nexus). But see Base Metal Trading v. OJSC 
“Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory,” 283 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 
822 (2002) (finding that the property involved also had to have some connection with the 
cause of action and denying enforcement). Cf. Glencore Grain Rotterdam v. Shivnath Rai 
Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the New York Convention 
does not abrogate the requirement of personal jurisdiction). 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). 
 27. See, e.g., Doe v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 851 F.3d 7 (D.D.C. 2017). 
See also Benjamin Kurland, Sovereign Immunity in Cyber Space:  Towards Defining a Cyber-
Intrusion Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 10 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 255, 267–68 (2019) (proposing a new cyber-intrusion exception to the FSIA permitting 
actions for cyber-intrusion “regardless of the location of the tortfeasor”). 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. 
 29. See id.  In contrast, the newest anti-terrorism provision (commonly referred to as 
“JASTA”) rests on a much clearer territorial nexus:  it removes foreign state immunity in suits 
by U.S. national arising out of acts of international terrorism that occur in the United States 
and “a tortious act or acts of the foreign state, or of any official, employee, or agent of that 
foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency, 
regardless where the tortious act or acts of the foreign state occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605B(b). 
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Over time, a number of lawsuits have been brought by U.S. victims under 
the FSIA’s “state-sponsored terrorism” exception seeking damages from the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
on the basis of their alleged involvement in various attacks abroad.  If those 
entities qualified as “foreign states,” the suits would be governed by the 
relaxed jurisdictional standards of the “state-sponsored terrorism” exception.  
U.S. courts have repeatedly held, however, that because Palestine is not 
recognized by the United States as a foreign state, neither the PA nor the PLO 
is subject to suit in U.S. courts under the provisions of the FSIA.30 
Strong congressional support for providing civil remedies in U.S. courts 
for U.S. nationals injured or killed in terrorist acts abroad led to the enactment 
of the federal Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), adopted as part of the so-called 
Patriot Act of 2001.31  It authorizes U.S. nationals to bring civil claims for 
injuries and losses “by reason of an act of international terrorism”32 which 
“occur[s] primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or 
transcend[s] national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are 
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or 
the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.”33  The 
principal argument for the assertion of such extraterritorial jurisdiction by the 
United States is that protecting American citizens from attacks abroad—and 
providing them judicial remedies when they are attacked—is justified by 
“vital U.S. interests.”34 
In consequence, unable to pursue the PA and PLO under the FSIA, 
plaintiffs sought to hold them liable under the ATA’s civil remedies 
provisions.  The issue then arose whether either the PA or the PLO has 
sufficient connections to the United States to satisfy the relevant 
requirements of “due process.”  To date, the courts have answered in the 
negative. 
For example, in Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization,35 the 
Second Circuit held that the two entities do enjoy full due process protection.  
In civil cases, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (applicable, 
the court said, because the action rests on a federal statute) does subject the 
United States to the same territorial limitations as the Fourteenth Amendment 
imposes on individual States.  The court also concluded that under the factual 
circumstances of the case it could not permit either (i) the exercise of “general 
jurisdiction” in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler or (ii) the 
exercise of “specific jurisdiction” because there was “no basis to conclude 
 
 30. See, e.g., Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 402 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005); 
Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 583 F. Supp. 2d 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 31. H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (Oct. 23, 2001), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2331. 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). 
 33. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(C). 
 34. Cf. Brief of United States Senators Charles E. Grassley et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 4, Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 583 F. Supp. 2d 451 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 16-1071). 
 35. 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation 
Organization, 138 S. Ct. 1438 (2018). 
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that the defendants participated in these acts in the United States or that their 
liability for these acts resulted from their actions that did occur in the United 
States.”36 
To much the same effect was the trial court’s decision in Safra v. 
Palestinian Authority,37 holding that the Palestinian Authority has due 
process rights and categorically rejecting “decades-old cases reasoning that 
the Palestine Liberation Organization has no rights because it is outside of 
the constitutional structure of the United States.”38  The court also concluded 
that it lacked general jurisdiction under the Daimler/Goodyear framework, 
as well as specific jurisdiction under the minimum-contact standards 
articulated in Walden v. Fiore.39 
In Livnat v. Palestinian Authority,40 the D.C. Circuit observed that “no 
court has ever held that the Fifth Amendment permits personal jurisdiction 
without the same ‘minimum contacts’ with the United States as the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires with respect to States.”41  It explicitly 
rejected the argument that because the PA “functions as a government” it 
should be deemed (like foreign states) not to be a “person” for purposes of 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  It emphasized that “[t]he rule 
in Price—that foreign states are not ‘persons’ under the Due Process 
Clause—applies only to sovereign foreign states.”42  Since plaintiffs had not 
satisfied the requirements of personal jurisdiction, the court affirmed 
dismissal of their action.43 
Eventually, these decisions (with which the federal government has 
concurred)44 prompted the Congress to amend the ATA to overcome the 
jurisdictional hurdles.  It did so by specifying certain conditions under which 
a defendant can be “deemed” to have consented to personal jurisdiction in 
actions under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).45  In doing so, the House specifically 
 
 36. Id. at 337 (emphasis added).  The Court also held that the PLO and PA had not waived 
their objections to suit in the United States. Id. at 328.  See generally Kent A. Yalowitz, The 
Constitutional Power of Congress to Provide for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Civil Anti-
Terrorism Matters, 29 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 369 (2019). 
 37. 82 F. Supp. 3d 37 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Livnat v. Palestinian Authority, 851 
F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 373 (2018). 
 38. Id. at 45. 
 39. Id. at 47–53 (citing Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014)). 
 40. Livnat v. Palestinian Authority, 851 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 
373 (2018). 
 41. Id. at 54. 
 42. Id. at 49 (referring to the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002)) (emphasis added). 
 43. See Estate of Klieman by & through Kesner v. Palestinian Authority, 923 F.3d 1115 
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (following the holding in Livnat). 
 44. The Executive Branch has agreed that under the prevailing approach, only States of 
the Union are placed outside the category of “persons” so that foreign non-state entities are 
not barred from seeking due process protections. See Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae at 9, Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 583 F. Supp. 2d 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 
16-1071). 
 45. See Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 115-23, 132 Stat. 3183 (2018) 
(amending the statute to add 18 U.S.C. § 2334(e), which provides that a defendant will be 
“deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction in such civil action” if that defendant 
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stated that “[c]arrying out or assisting an act of international terrorism that 
injures or kills American citizens abroad should be, in and of itself, sufficient 
to establish personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts.”46 
The point, of course, is that at least in the terrorism context, the limitations 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have been seen as presenting an 
obstacle to efforts to obtain justice for U.S. nationals, and the 
Katzenbach/Weltover “states are not persons” approach47 curtailing the rights 
of the defendants appears to offer a better avenue by which to allow victims 
to seek recovery for injuries caused by acts of terrorism abroad. 
V.  WUERTH’S ANALYSIS 
To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has left open both questions:  (i) whether, 
for purposes of constitutional due process, foreign states, governments and 
SOEs are (or are not) “persons,” and (ii) whether the Fifth Amendment 
imposes the same due process limits on a federal court’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction as the Fourteenth Amendment does on state courts.48  However, 
no serious challenge has recently been brought to the proposition that foreign 
states (like States of the Union) are not persons and thus do not enjoy the 
benefits of the due process clauses of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.  
Tellingly, the recently published Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States does not take a definitive position on either 
question, even though it addresses issues of jurisdiction and sovereign 
immunity at some length.49 
Wuerth speaks directly to that doctrinal gap. 
In a nutshell, her article argues that (i) foreign states, governments, and 
their SOEs are “persons” and are entitled to due process under Article III as 
well as the Fifth Amendment, and (ii) accordingly, federal courts should have 
 
accepts certain forms of assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or establishes or 
maintains “any office, headquarters, premises, or other facilities or establishments within the 
jurisdiction of the United States”). 
 46. H.R. Rep. No. 115-858, at 6 (2018).  Thus far, plaintiffs do not seem to have much 
greater success under the new statute. See, e.g., Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 
925 F.3d 570 (2d Cir. 2019).  For an alternative proposal, see Arnowitz Drescher, Seeking 
Justice for America’s Forgotten Victims: Reforming the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
Terrorism Exception, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 791 (2012). 
 47. See supra notes 1, 4 and accompanying text. 
 48. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783–84 (2017) 
(“In addition, since our decision concerns the due process limits on the exercise of specific 
jurisdiction by a State, we leave open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the 
same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court.”) 
 49. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 454 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (“Under U.S. law, the exercise of jurisdiction by courts in 
the United States is subject to the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Due process requires that in order to adjudicate claims against a defendant, the 
defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum [citing to section 422 on Personal 
Jurisdiction in general], but several lower courts have held that foreign states are not 
constitutionally protected by the Fifth Amendment.  Courts have nevertheless interpreted the 
FSIA as requiring a nexus between the foreign state and the United States that would satisfy 
or exceed constitutionally based due-process protections.”); see also Reporters’ Note 9, 
entitled “state long-arm statutes and due process,” collecting relevant decisions. 
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power over them, like all other defendants, only when they meet the same 
jurisdictional requirements and have been given notice on a basis comparable 
to the rules applicable to private actors.50 
Her path to these conclusions, however, does not rest on a resolution of the 
relative scope of the protections afforded by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Rather, she finds the basis for a solution in the history and text 
of Article III, a faithful reading of which—she contends—demonstrates the 
Founders’ intent to afford due process protections to foreign states.  As a 
result, she concludes, “[f]ederal courts only have power over defendants to 
whom notice is provided and over whom the court has jurisdiction, and these 
limitations apply to all defendants.”51 
The structure of her argument is at once doctrinal (“originalist”), historical, 
and pragmatic.  Her point of departure is the fact that Article III, Section 2 
explicitly extends the “judicial Power” of the United States to controversies 
involving foreign states (which she denominates “foreign-state diversity 
jurisdiction”) and assigns cases between foreign states and U.S. States to the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.52  That means, in her view, that 
“foreign states are not categorically excluded from separation-of-powers 
protections, that the Constitution was intended to benefit foreign states as a 
way of ensuring peace and prosperity for the United States, and that foreign 
states are not entirely outside the structure of the federal government.”53 
To the contrary, she contends, foreign states were, and remain, 
“unequivocally drawn into the fabric of the Union for the very purpose of 
protecting them and limiting international conflict.”54  Those protections, she 
says, are “baked into Article III”55 and are therefore not dependent on 
Congressional implementation—since the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction is “self-executing” and (unlike its appellate jurisdiction) not 
subject to legislative limitation.56  Thus, foreign states have due process 
rights and are protected by “separation of powers.”57 
Several consequences flow from these conclusions, most importantly that, 
even though the protections derived from Article III may not be entirely co-
extensive with those of the Fifth Amendment, they place foreign states on 
 
 50. Although the title of Wuerth’s article refers to “The Due Process and Other 
Constitutional Rights,” her focus is on the former and, while hinting at “equal protection,” she 
does not elaborate on what “other” rights may be at issue. 
 51. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 690.  To be sure, she also concludes that foreign states are 
also entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment, which—viewed in its proper 
historical light—“meant a territorially restricted power to compel attendance before the court, 
linking the term to personal jurisdiction.” Id. 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  Under the Eleventh Amendment, of course, suits against one 
of the constituent States by citizens of another State, or “Citizens or subjects of any Foreign 
State,” were excluded from the “Judicial Power of the United States.” Id. 
 53. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 637. 
 54. Id. at 639. 
 55. Id. at 638. 
 56. Id. at 660, 689–90 (“The wholesale exclusion of foreign states from constitutional 
protections when they face suit in the United States cuts against the grain of Article III”). 
 57. Id. at 689. 
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“an equal footing” with foreign corporations.58  Properly read, she contends, 
Article III “provides procedural protections to all litigants in federal court, 
including foreign states,”59 because of the necessary relationship between 
“jurisdiction” and “notice” as understood in their historical context.60  She 
argues that “Article III’s conferral of ‘judicial power’ over ‘cases’ means that 
federal courts must have personal jurisdiction and must give notice to all 
defendants, whether or not they are protected by due process.”61  These 
protections, she concedes, may be minimal, but they are also not nothing.  
“Congress may, of course, afford foreign states greater jurisdictional 
protections than the Constitution requires . . . .  [Moreover], due process 
provides protections beyond personal jurisdiction.”62 
For instance, she suggests that foreign states should be “constitutionally 
entitled not only to due process protections but also to assistance of counsel, 
the right to a jury trial, and protection against double jeopardy.”63 
To be sure, Wuerth also asserts that the Fifth Amendment applies to and 
protects foreign states much as it does foreign corporations.64  She finds 
evidence indicating that—from the Founding until the enactment of the 
FSIA—“courts, litigants, Congress, scholars, and the U.S. government all 
reasoned or assumed that the Due Process Clauses (and thus the minimum 
contacts analysis) applied to foreign states.”65 
She also notes that “[d]uring congressional deliberation about the FSIA, 
executive branch officials repeatedly referred to the due process rights of 
foreign sovereigns.”66  Weltover and its progeny, in her view, altered that 
understanding by (wrongly) excluding foreign states from the definition of 
“persons,” rendering them “vulnerable to political action by the majority in 
ways that domestic states are not.”67 
 
 58. Id. at 687 (“[F]oreign states share constitutionally significant attributes not just with 
corporations, but also with U.S. states.”). 
 59. Id. at 655. 
 60. Id. at 675 (referring to Serv. of Process on a British Ship-of-War, 1 U.S. Op. Att’y 
Gen. 87, 88 (1799), Wuerth explains that “[t]he connections between ‘process,’ personal 
jurisdiction, and the territorial limits of sovereign power are clear from the 1799 Opinion of 
the U.S. Attorney General”). 
 61. Id. at 673–74. 
 62. Id. at 683–84, 685 (including “notice” requirements). 
 63. Id. at 689. 
 64. “[F]oreign states and private foreign corporations are on equal due process footing, 
contrary to a long line of lower court cases drawing a constitutional distinction between them.”  
Id. at 637–38.  For purposes of the Fifth Amendment, she argues that states should be 
considered “persons” entitled to due process and should stand on the same footing as private 
foreign corporations, citing the Second Circuit to the effect that “the constitutional distinction 
between foreign states and corporations ‘rests on the principle that due process rights can only 
be exercised by persons, including corporations, which are persons at law.’” Id. at 650 (citing 
to Corporacion Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex Exploracion 
y Produccion, 832 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2016)). 
 65. Id. at 644.  In support, she refers inter alia to the Supreme Court’s decision in The 
Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. 283, 353 (1822). See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 673. 
 66. Id. at 646. 
 67. Id. at 649. 
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Wuerth does not, however, give a concise definition of exactly what Fifth 
Amendment due process would provide in the case of foreign states, other 
than suggesting that it was historically more limited than understood today.68  
She opposes the incorporation of Fourteenth Amendment concepts (which 
she describes as a “mess”69), acknowledges that Congress controls the extent 
of “personal jurisdiction” under the Fifth Amendment,70 and observes that 
“Congress may, of course, afford foreign states greater jurisdictional 
protections than the Constitution requires.”71 
VI.  THE BROADER CONTEXT 
It is difficult to argue with Wuerth’s conclusion that “when foreign states 
and related entities face suit in the United States, whether a criminal action 
brought by federal prosecutors or a civil case based on an exception to the 
FSIA, basic litigation-related constitutional protections should generally 
apply.”72  As she points out, the contrary approach makes no sense and 
indeed offends basic constitutional precepts.  She rightly asserts that “[t]he 
wholesale exclusion of foreign states from constitutional protections when 
they face suit in the United States cuts against the grain of Article III, which 
explicitly brought foreign entities into the federal judicial system with the 
intention of protecting them.”73 
On one level, deriving those rights from Article III has the benefit of 
moving the debate beyond the question of whether foreign states are properly 
considered “persons” and instead connecting the issue of “personal 
jurisdiction” with the very notion of “judicial power.”  Clearly, it is correct 
to emphasize that notice and opportunity to appear are fundamental to any 
legitimate exercise of personal jurisdiction.  It may also be faithful to the 
intent of the Founders in giving the Supreme Court “foreign state diversity 
jurisdiction” as a way of helping the fledgling United States to avoid 
violations of international law, including treaty commitments.74  Moreover, 
anchoring the proposition in “separation of powers” doctrine provides some 
measure of protection against legislative encroachment. 
Yet it does not provide a complete answer.  If whatever rights can be 
derived directly from Article III are only “minimal,” how might they be 
articulated and by whom—Congress or the courts?  Wuerth’s solution is to 
acknowledge that foreign states and governments (and their SOEs) are indeed 
properly considered “persons” at least for purposes of litigation in U.S. courts 
 
 68. Id. at 690 (“Cases involving foreign sovereigns illustrate that Fifth Amendment 
‘process’ meant a territorially restricted power to compel attendance before the court, linking 
the term to personal jurisdiction.”) 
 69. Id. at 682. 
 70. Id. at 637. 
 71. Id. at 683–84. 
 72. Id. at 689. 
 73. Id. at 689–90.  Of course, at the time of the Founding and for nearly two hundred years 
after, foreign states enjoyed “absolute immunity” and thus would be subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction only by consent—a sharp distinction from the current situation. See id. at 670. 
 74. Id. at 655. 
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and are thus entitled to enjoy the same rights under the Fifth Amendment as 
foreign corporations enjoy (if not all litigants).  Clearly, the Fifth Amendment 
offers a more solid basis than Article III on which to decide such questions 
and is more rationally related to the challenges of foreign state litigation than 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Yet the Fifth Amendment, as Wuerth concedes, has not been interpreted 
necessarily to include a “minimum contacts” analysis in the same fashion as 
the Fourteenth Amendment has.75  What might be required for personal 
jurisdiction is therefore whatever Congress might say is required, so long as 
it does not fall beneath whatever floor Article III establishes and does not 
discriminate against foreign states.76  Thus (if I follow the argument 
correctly), for purposes of personal jurisdiction, Article III and the Fifth 
Amendment together impose only certain minimal standards and if Congress 
imposes some requirements for individuals, or at least for foreign 
corporations, it must impose the same requirements for foreign states. 
Such a rule of “equivalence” (perhaps rooted in the “equal protection” 
doctrine) would prevent discriminatory treatment of foreign states but would 
not seem to resolve the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction or indicate what 
might be done to protect foreign states, governments, and SOEs from 
particularly expansive assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  If the 
Constitution itself does not dictate rules circumscribing assertions of 
personal jurisdiction in the sovereign context, and if (as Wuerth concedes) 
“Congress is not limited by ‘minimum contacts’ in determining the 
jurisdiction of federal courts over any kind of defendant, whether public or 
private,”77 then what constrains a legislative grant of judicial jurisdiction 
over people (including governments), places, and activities entirely outside 
the United States simply (for example) on the basis that it would serve “vital 
U.S. interests” however they might be defined at any given juncture? 
To put it otherwise, even if Article III and the Fifth Amendment require (i) 
some minimal “‘positivist’ personal jurisdiction protections”78 and (ii) 
consistent application of personal jurisdiction principles, one has to wonder 
whether the Congress would be inclined towards a less aggressive or more 
protective approach than, say, it has recently adopted in respect of the FSIA 
or the ATA.  It is possible that having to impose the same requirements on 
(or protections for) private litigants as for foreign states and governments and 
their SOEs might act as a constraint for practical reasons. 
Absent such legislation, it is conceivable that, in a given litigation, a court 
might be induced to look to Article III rather than either the Fifth or 
Fourteenth Amendments in deciding about the propriety of a given 
jurisdictional assertion (say, by embracing Wuerth’s analogy between 
 
 75. Id. at 683. 
 76. For an argument that Congress should enact legislation conferring due process rights 
on foreign state-owned corporations, see Frederick Watson Vaughn, Foreign States are 
Foreign States:  Why Foreign State-Owned Corporations Are Not Persons Under the Due 
Process Clause, 45 GA. L. REV. 913 (2011). 
 77. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 679. 
 78. Id. at 685. 
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foreign governments and foreign corporations), but it seems a somewhat 
risky—and perhaps fairly remote—possibility. 
At the same time, Wuerth’s approach wisely avoids the dangerous 
implications of the broad-brush argument that all foreign states and 
governments (and their SOEs) are “persons” for all constitutional purposes 
and necessarily have the same constitutional rights as all other “persons” 
under U.S. law.  Some years ago, Professor Lori Fisler Damrosch articulated 
the compelling reasons why that broad proposition must be approached with 
great caution, especially when it intrudes upon “plenary power of the political 
branches to determine national policy with respect to foreign states.”79  She 
distinguished between questions concerning the involvement of foreign 
states in judicial proceedings on the one hand, and efforts by foreign states 
to use the judicial process to interfere with the political process, especially to 
challenge decisions taken by the political branches with respect to the foreign 
relations of the United States.80  To the extent that Wuerth’s approach is 
limited to the former—to issues of “litigation-related protections in federal 
court” including jurisdiction—it avoids that pitfall.81 
As Damrosch and others also recognize, arguments at the other extreme—
that foreign states, governments, and their SOEs have no constitutionally 
recognized rights, including no due process rights—are equally flawed and 
dangerous.  As one commentator recently observed,82 denying foreign states 
due process protections not only violates basic constitutional principles but 
threatens to strain diplomatic relations: 
[b]y firmly establishing constitutional protections for foreign states, the 
Supreme Court will not only remedy the “lack of coherence” of circuit court 
decisions, but also limit court interference in U.S. foreign policy and 
bilateral relations by restricting courts’ ability to obligate countries to court 
and thus to enter judgments against these countries.83 
Wuerth’s article contributes helpfully to the effort to give substance to the 
“middle ground” between the “all rights” and “no rights” extremes. 
 
 79. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 483, 486 
(1987). 
 80. Id. at 486–87. 
 81. In this context, the separation of powers argument carries some serious potential 
consequences.  If foreign states and governments are deemed “persons” for all constitutional 
purposes, and if in consequence they are recognized as having the right (or “standing”) to raise 
separation of powers issues in litigation, they would be empowered to ask the courts to limit 
the political branches’ foreign relations powers.  Since—unlike States of the Union—they are 
by definition not part of the U.S. political structure, that possibility seems inappropriate, even 
dangerous.  In any event, the extent to which the “separation of powers” doctrine actually 
gives anyone other than the political branches of the federal government and States of the 
Union a constitutional “right” is open to question. 
 82. See, e.g., Laura J. Rosenberger, Our Allies Have Rights, Too:  Judicial Departure from 
In Personam Case Law to Interference in International Politics, 5 NAT’L SEC. L. J. 307 (2017). 
 83. Id. at 334. 
